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Flash Drive Lock
From Schneier on Security

Flash Drive Lock

This device is clever: it's a three-digit combination lock that prevents a USB drive from being read. It's not going to keep out anyone serious, but is a great...

Tracking Connected Vehicles
From Schneier on Security

Tracking Connected Vehicles

Researchers have shown that it is both easy and cheap to surveil connected vehicles. The second link talks about various anonymization techniques, none of which...

Why Is the NSA Moving Away from Elliptic Curve Cryptography?
From Schneier on Security

Why Is the NSA Moving Away from Elliptic Curve Cryptography?

In August, I wrote about the NSA's plans to move to quantum-resistant algorithms for its own cryptographic needs. Cryptographers Neal Koblitz and Alfred Menezes...

The Doxing Trend
From Schneier on Security

The Doxing Trend

If the director of the CIA can't keep his e-mail secure, what hope do the rest of us have -- for our e-mail or any of our digital information? None, and that's...

The Need for Transparency in Surveillance
From Schneier on Security

The Need for Transparency in Surveillance

In Data and Goliath, I talk about the need for transparency, oversight, and accountability as the mechanism to allow surveillance when it is necessary, while preserving...

Ravens Can Identify Cheaters
From Schneier on Security

Ravens Can Identify Cheaters

Ravens have been shown to identify and remember cheaters among their unkindness....

Microsoft's Brad Smith on the Collapse of Safe Harbor
From Schneier on Security

Microsoft's Brad Smith on the Collapse of Safe Harbor

Microsoft's President Brad Smith has a blog post discussing what to do now that the US-EU safe-harbor agreement has collapsed. He outlines four steps: First, we...

Friday Squid Blogging: Squid Bed Sheets
From Schneier on Security

Friday Squid Blogging: Squid Bed Sheets

Some nice options....

Forensic Analysis of Smart Card Fraud
From Schneier on Security

Forensic Analysis of Smart Card Fraud

This paper describes what is almost certainly the most sophisticated chip-and-pin credit card fraud to date. News article. BoingBoing post....

Hacking Fitbit
From Schneier on Security

Hacking Fitbit

This is impressive: "An attacker sends an infected packet to a fitness tracker nearby at bluetooth distance then the rest of the attack occurs by itself, without...

Police Want Genetic Data from Corporate Repositories
From Schneier on Security

Police Want Genetic Data from Corporate Repositories

Both the FBI and local law enforcement are trying to get the genetic data stored at companies like 23andMe. No surprise, really. As NYU law professor Erin Murphy...

Forgotten Passwords
From Schneier on Security

Forgotten Passwords

Funny monologue....

Security Risks of Unpatched Android Software
From Schneier on Security

Security Risks of Unpatched Android Software

A lot has been written about the security vulnerability resulting from outdated and unpatched Android software. The basic problem is that while Google regularly...

How to Commandeer a Store PA System
From Schneier on Security

How to Commandeer a Store PA System

If you call the proper phone extension, you have complete control over the public address system at a Target store....

Friday Squid Blogging: Squid Photos
From Schneier on Security

Friday Squid Blogging: Squid Photos

"Terrifying" squid photos. As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven't covered....

Mapping FinFisher Users
From Schneier on Security

Mapping FinFisher Users

Citizen Lab continues to do excellent work exposing the world's cyber-weapons arms manufacturers. Its latest report attempts to track users of Gamma International's...

Breaking Diffie-Hellman with Massive Precomputation (Again)
From Schneier on Security

Breaking Diffie-Hellman with Massive Precomputation (Again)

The Internet is abuzz with this blog post and paper, speculating that the NSA is breaking the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol in the wild through massive precomputation...

Problems with DNA Evidence
From Schneier on Security

Problems with DNA Evidence

Turns out it's fallible....

On Cyber Arms Control Treaties
From Schneier on Security

On Cyber Arms Control Treaties

Good op-ed....

Obama Administration Not Pursuing a Backdoor to Commercial Encryption
From Schneier on Security

Obama Administration Not Pursuing a Backdoor to Commercial Encryption

The Obama Administration is not pursuing a law that would force computer and communications manufacturers to add backdoors to their products for law enforcement...
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