By Kellogg S. Booth
Communications of the ACM,
November 1981,
Vol. 24 No. 11, Pages 772-774
10.1145/358790.358798
Comments
One of Needham and Schroeder's proposed signature authentication protocols is shown to fail when there is a possibility of compromised keys: this invalidates one of the applications of their technique. A more elaborate mechanism is proposed which does not require a network clock, but does require a third party to the transaction. The latter approach is shown to be reliable in a fairly strong sense.
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