University of Maryland researchers have developed several mathematical models, including stochastic opponent modeling agents and multi-player game theoretic models, to understand how terrorism in India can be reduced.
The researchers looked for Nash equilibria, which specify situations in which no entity involved in the game theoretic model can do better without upsetting one of five entities: the United States, India, the Pakistani military, the Pakistani civilian government, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist group.
"We did not find a single Nash equilibrium in which LeT exhibits good behavior in which the U.S. expands financial aid to Pakistan," says Maryland professor V.S. Subrahmanian.
The researchers also used their algorithms to learn about the behavior of other terrorist groups in India, such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Indian Mujahideen. "Computational models and algorithms can help decision-makers shape improved counter-terrorism strategies and policies for threat reduction," Subrahmanian says.
From UMD Newsdesk
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