Researchers at Belgium's Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KU Leuven) ruled out an algorithm selected by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology as a potential post-quantum encryption program.
The Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) algorithm was thought to be quantum-decryption-proof by avoiding key encapsulation's vulnerabilities through a supersingular isogeny graph.
KU Leuven researchers used a single classical computer to break SIKE, which took it just one hour.
The team showed SIKE's linchpin, the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) protocol, is vulnerable to a variant of a GPST adaptive attack that "exploits the fact that SIDH has auxiliary points and that the degree of the secret isogeny is known," explained Steven Galbraith at New Zealand's University of Auckland.
From Ars Technica
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